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Abstract
Our memory is often surprisingly inaccurate, with errors ranging from
misremembering minor details of events to generating illusory memories of
entire episodes. The pervasiveness of such false memories generates a
puzzle: in the face of selection pressure for accuracy of memory, how could
such systematic failures have persisted over evolutionary time? It is possible
that memory errors are an inevitable by-product of our adaptive memories and
that semantic false memories are specifically connected to our ability to learn
rules and concepts and to classify objects by category memberships. Here we
test this possibility using a standard experimental false memory paradigm and
inter-individual variation in verbal categorisation ability. Indeed it turns out that
the error scores are significantly negatively correlated, with those individuals
scoring fewer errors on the categorisation test being more susceptible to false
memory intrusions in a free recall test. A similar trend, though not significant,
was observed between individual categorisation ability and false memory
susceptibility in a word recognition task. Our results therefore indicate that false
memories, to some extent, might be a by-product of our ability to learn rules,
categories and concepts.
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Introduction
When remembering the past, we typically feel that our memory 
allows retrieval of events as they really occurred. Yet a large body 
of work shows that memory is often surprisingly inaccurate, with 
errors ranging from misremembering minor details of events to 
generating illusory memories of entire episodes (Loftus, 1997). 
False memory, the phenomenon of remembering something that 
actually never occurred, has become a widely studied topic since 
its origins in Binet’s (1900) La Suggestibilité and Bartlett’s (1932) 
Remembering. The pervasiveness of such false memories generates 
an evolutionary puzzle; in the face of selection pressure for accu-
racy of memory (Dukas, 1999; Mery, 2013; Raine & Chittka, 2008), 
how could such systematic failures have persisted over evolutionary 
time? As with perceptual illusions, false memories might be inevi-
table by-products of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes. Here 
we explore whether individuals with a higher propensity to form 
false memories are better at other cognitive tasks, thus generating 
a trade-off by which certain cognitive capacities (in this case form-
ing links between distinct memories, as in categorisation) cannot be 
achieved without the cost of memory inaccuracies.
A plethora of experimental paradigms exist for eliciting differing 
types of false memories in declarative memory, i.e. people’s con-
scious memory for facts (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Episodic (and 
as such autobiographical) false memories are commonly elicited 
using the misinformation paradigm, in which information provided 
or questions asked after an event can bias memory (Loftus, 2005). 
Conversely, semantic false memories can be elicited using the 
presentation of lists of semantically related words (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The so called Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm has become widely used for explor-
ing the malleability of memory. In this paradigm, participants begin 
by studying lists of words; for example a list may comprise the 
words mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, 
hatred, mean, calm, emotion, enrage. Each list is composed of the 
15 strongest associates of one critically non-presented word, for 
example anger for the above list. Upon free recall of the lists or dur-
ing a recognition test, the non-presented words are ‘remembered’ 
at high rates and with high levels of confidence. This high propor-
tion of false memories is attributed to the strength of the associa-
tions between the words presented in the lists and the words falsely 
remembered (Deese, 1959).
While such tests might be viewed as rather remote from real-life 
situations in which the accuracy of memory matters, including epi-
sodic memories (DePrince et al., 2004; Freyd & Gleaves, 1996), 
it has recently been proposed that different types of false memo-
ries may share, at least in part, the same underlying mechanisms 
(Otgaar et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2013). Otgaar et al., (2012) showed 
that children who generate a rich false memory when subjected to 
a typical false memory implantation paradigm, such as being led 
to believe they once took a ride in a hot air balloon (which in fact 
never occurred), are also more susceptible to false memories in a 
DRM test than children who do not develop a rich implanted false 
memory. Thus the DRM paradigm, artificial though it may seem, 
can be a useful laboratory paradigm to test individual false memory 
susceptibility more generally (but see Ost et al., 2013).
False memories, like other memory inaccuracies (such as forget-
ting) might be by-products of the otherwise adaptive nature of 
memory processes (Howe et al., 2013; Schacter, 1999; Schacter & 
Dodson, 2001; Schacter et al., 2011). But what cognitive processes 
might facilitate the generation of false memories as a by-product? 
It is possible that our abilities for rule learning, association and 
categorisation might come at a cost when it comes to memorising 
isolated facts, events, or indeed words. Specifically with respect to 
the semantic false memories tested in the DRM paradigm, errors 
might be produced by the ability of individuals to group words 
together, placing them in categories based on rules for membership. 
It therefore seems plausible that the creation of these semantic false 
memories may be a by-product of our ability to group words into 
categories.
Categorising items is known to generate adaptive benefits such as 
the ability to learn information more quickly and to show greater 
efficiency during decision-making (Merritt et al., 2010), but 
McClelland (1995) argues that whilst such categorisation “is cen-
tral to our ability to act intelligently” it however “gives rise to distor-
tion as an inherent by-product” (p. 84). It is therefore possible that 
some memory errors are an inevitable fluke of a powerful, adaptive 
cognitive phenomenon, in the case of semantic false memories our 
ability to learn rules and concepts, and to classify novel objects 
by category memberships (Carey, 2011; Chittka & Jensen, 2011). 
Indeed, categorisation is a strategy to economise on memory, since 
it allows recognising objects by a limited set of features that define 
the category, rather than memorising every single possible mem-
ber of the category (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2011; Chittka & Niven, 
2009; Srinivasan, 2006).
One possibility to explore the potential trade-off between categori-
sation ability and false memory susceptibility is to exploit variation 
between individuals, and to test whether superior performance on 
the one test comes with increased error rates on the other. Inter-
individual variation is the raw material for evolution, and offers 
the possibility to quantify the fitness benefits of cognitive traits in 
natural settings (Cole et al., 2012; Raine & Chittka, 2008; Rowe & 
Healy, 2014; Thornton et al., 2014) and to test potential trade-offs 
between one cognitive capacity and another (Boogert et al., 2011; 
Raine & Chittka, 2012). Here we investigate a potential correlation 
between an individual’s proneness to semantic type false memories 
and their categorisation ability. For this purpose we subjected par-
ticipants to a DRM paradigm to assess their semantic false memory 
susceptibility and a test consisting of verbal reasoning questions 
to assess their ability to form categories. Our findings indicate that 
false memories, to some extent, might be a by-product of our ability 
to learn rules, categories and concepts.
Methods
The general method for eliciting false memories was based on 
Roediger & McDermott (1995) and Stadler et al., (1999). The 
protocol for the visual presentation of the wordlists was adapted 
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from Peters et al., (2008). The categorisation test was constructed 
from educational aids published by Coordination Group Publica-
tions Ltd (Parsons, 2002a; Parsons, 2002b), Chukra Ltd, (2007) and 
Eleven Plus Exam Group, (2010).
Participants
Thirty-nine 2nd year undergraduate students from the School of 
Biological & Chemical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London 
participated in the study. The participants were one full class undertaking 
a ‘statistics’ module and as such the experiment formed part of their 
learning, with a report writing task set from the results. Participant 
demographics were as follows: seven male, thirty-two female, aged 
nineteen to thirty years. Full ethics approval was obtained from 
Queen Mary University of London Research Ethics Committee (Ref 
#0355) and all participants gave written consent of their acceptance 
to participate in the study.
Materials
To elicit the false memories, eighteen wordlists were used. Each 
wordlist consisted of the fifteen most commonly associated words 
of a critical non-presented word. For example the list mad, fear, 
hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, hatred, mean, calm, 
emotion, enrage is composed of the fifteen strongest associates of 
the word anger and whilst the fifteen words in the list were shown 
to participants, the critical word anger was not.
The wordlists were constructed using the first fifteen words listed in 
the Russell & Jenkins, (1954) norms for the critical non-presented 
words (see Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler et al., 1999 
for full details of list construction). The eighteen wordlists were 
chosen for their known ability to elicit a high proportion of false 
memories during recall (Stadler et al., 1999). The eighteen critical 
non-presented words used (and their corresponding fifteen word-
lists) were: window, sleep, smell, doctor, sweet, chair, smoke, rough, 
needle, anger, trash, soft, city, cup, cold, mountain, slow, river (Stadler 
et al., 1999).
The wordlists were put into an automated computerised visual 
presentation (Microsoft Powerpoint 2007, version 12.0.6654.5000) 
in which each word was displayed in bold, black ‘Calibri Head-
ings’ typeface, font size eighteen. Each word was displayed in the 
centre of a white screen at a rate of one second per word, with an 
inter-word interval of approximately five hundred milliseconds. To 
mark the start and end of a wordlist a white screen containing a 
black cross was displayed for one second. Following the end of 
each wordlist a blank white screen was displayed for two minutes. 
This coincided with the two minute free recall period (see below). 
The list order was randomised and the words within each list were 
presented in order of their associative strength to the critical non-
presented word, strongest to weakest.
The recognition test was comprised of one hundred and eight words 
randomly ordered in four columns of twenty-seven on a sheet of 
paper. The one hundred and eight words were those from serial 
positions one, eight, and ten of each of the eighteen studied lists, 
the eighteen critical lures, and thirty-six unrelated words not found 
in any of the eighteen lists. The thirty-six unrelated words were 
selected from the other eighteen word lists published in Stadler et al., 
(1999) and from the Oxford English Dictionary. The 36 ‘incorrect’ 
words were: young, chess, circus, march, ink, rye, keys, chequered, 
soccer, basket, noon, muscle, piano, scribble, bounce, button, feelers, 
jail, jubilee, rubric, folder, paint, postcard, fan, lamp, book, com-
puter, first, thought, tile, hide, worth, planet, radio, arm, basement.
The categorisation test consisted of forty-five printed questions. 
Each question consisted of five words, three of which were associ-
ated with one another and two of which were not. Participants were 
required to circle the two words that were not associated. An exam-
ple of a question is as follows: 1. curve, arc, crouch, bend, medicine, 
where curve, arc and bend are the three words associated with one 
another and crouch and medicine are the words to be correctly cir-
cled. Source materials for the categorisation test were example ver-
bal reasoning questions for UK 11+ exams (secondary school entry 
exams). Questions were reproduced with copyright permission from 
Coordination Group Publications Ltd (Parsons, 2002a; Parsons, 
2002b), Chukra Ltd, (2007) and Eleven Plus Exam Group, (2010).
Protocol
All participants were tested in one sitting. Participants were advised 
that they would be tested on their memory for lists of words and that 
they would be required to solve some word puzzles.
Participants viewed the visual presentation containing the eighteen 
wordlists on a large screen (240cm width, 180cm height). At the 
end of each list a two minute recall period was given. During these 
free recall periods, participants were instructed to write down as 
many of the words from the list they had just seen as they could 
remember. Participants were instructed not to guess, but to only 
write down words that they were reasonably sure they had seen. 
Participants were provided with a booklet in which to write down 
their responses.
Participants then undertook the recognition test. They were instructed 
to carefully read the words on the sheet provided and to circle any 
words that they remembered being presented in the eighteen word-
lists. Again participants were instructed not to guess but to only 
circle words they were reasonably sure they had seen.
After the final recall period a ten minute break was given, but par-
ticipants were instructed not to talk to each other about the study. 
Participants were then given seven minutes to work through the cat-
egorisation test. Again they were instructed not to guess, but to only 
answer those questions to whose answer they were reasonably sure 
of. Upon completion participants were fully de-briefed as to the 
purpose of the study.
Data analysis
The number of critical non-presented words recalled (false memo-
ries), the number of critical non-presented words recognised (false 
memories), and the number of errors made on the categorisation 
test were calculated for each individual. These were also converted 
to give percentage errors (out of those possible to produce) to dis-
play graphically. We tested the data for normality and found that 
the distribution for both the categorisation test and the recognition 
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false memory test departed significantly from a normal distribution 
(Shapiro-Wilk normality test). Therefore a non-parametric correla-
tion analysis (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient) was used to 
look for a potential link between categorisation ability (categorisa-
tion test errors) and false memory susceptibility (recall and recog-
nition errors). Additional correlations were used on subsets of the 
data to check for any biasing effects of priming, outliers and age. 
Finally, the numbers of recall, recognition and categorisation errors 
were compared between males and females using Wilcoxon rank 
sum tests to look for an effect of gender. All analyses were carried 
out using R statistical software (v.2.14.1). P values below 0.05 were 
deemed significant.
Results
Dataset 1. False memory susceptibility and categorisation ability
http://dx.doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.4645.d31516
Individuals’ susceptibilities to false memories elicited using the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (given as the number 
of critical non-presented words recalled (Recall False memories, 
out of a total of 18) and recognised (Recognition False Memories, 
again out of 18)), and their categorisation abilities (given as the 
number of questions answered incorrectly on the categorisation test 
(Categorisation Test Errors, out of a total of 45)).
There were substantial inter-individual differences in both partici-
pants’ verbal categorisation abilities and their scores on a standard-
ised false memory test. Categorisation errors ranged from 7% to 
78% in different individuals (Mean 23%, SD 14%), showing that 
even though the test we had chosen was originally designed for pre-
teens, the task was sufficiently challenging for the tested population 
to capture a large range of inter-individual variation (Figure 1a). 
It was important to establish this since if all participants had near-
perfect scores (or indeed if all had equally poor scores), the test 
would not have been suitable to correlate individual variation with 
other assessments of cognitive performance.
Variation in individual false memory scores was likewise extensive. 
Recall false memory scores ranged from 0% to 78% (Mean 41%, 
SD 21%) of possible false memories made (Figure 1b). Two indi-
viduals did not recall a single critical non-presented word and thus 
had a score of zero (and 0%) for recall false memories. Conversely 
three individuals recalled thirteen out of the possible eighteen false 
memories (and thus scored 72%), and one participant even scored 
fourteen (78%). Recognition false memory scores ranged from 17% 
to 94% (Mean 63%, SD 21%) of possible false memories made 
(Figure 1c). Five individuals recognised five or less of the critical 
non-presented words (and thus scored 28% or less), whilst eighteen 
individuals recognised thirteen or more out of the eighteen possible 
false memories (and thus scored 72% or more).
Figure 1. Frequency histograms of individual variation in categorisation ability and false memory performance. a) the percentage 
of errors scored by individuals on the categorisation test, b) the percentage of false memories (out of those possible to elicit) recalled by 
individuals during the DRM paradigm and c) the percentage of false memories (out of those possible to elicit) recognised by individuals 
during the DRM paradigm. N=39. All show a spread of inter-individual variation.
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We found a significant negative correlation between individuals’ 
categorisation error scores (given as the number of questions answered 
incorrectly on the categorisation test) and their false memory sus-
ceptibility during free recall (given as the number of critical non-
presented words recalled) (r
s
=-0.345, df=37, p=0.032, Figure 2), 
thus those individuals scoring fewer errors on the categorisation 
test were more susceptible to false memory intrusions during free 
recall. In other words, participants that performed worse on the one 
test performed better on the other, and vice versa – indicating an 
inter-individual trade-off between categorisation ability on the one 
hand and false memory susceptibility during free recall on the other.
We also found a slight negative correlation between individuals’ 
categorisation error scores (given as the number of questions answered 
incorrectly on the categorisation test) and their false memory sus-
ceptibility during recognition (given as the number of critical non-
presented words recognised); however this trend was not significant 
(r
s
=-0.202, df=37, p=0.219, Figure 3).
To exclude the possibility that any correlation could be caused by 
priming, the data were also analysed excluding those categorisa-
tion test questions that contained words previously presented in the 
wordlists, and non-presented as one of the critical non-presented 
words. In our experiment for example, priming may have meant 
that the word eye presented as part of a question in the categorisa-
tion test: 41. Eye neck nose mouth shoulder, may have been pref-
erentially selected as an answer due to its previous presentation in 
the word list associated with the critical non-presented word needle 
– thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble, haystack, 
thorn, hurt, injection, syringe, cloth, knitting. As such the scores for 
twelve questions were removed. A significant negative correlation 
was still found for free recall and a moderate negative, though non-
significant, correlation found for recognition; thus priming cannot 
account for the result (recall: r
s
=-0.362, df=37, p=0.024, recogni-
tion: r
s
=-0.206, df=37, p=0.208).
Additionally, the removal of an outlier (a residuals vs. leverage plot 
showed a Cook’s distance greater than 0.5 for participant 24, see 
Dataset 1) did not change the statistical significance of the origi-
nal result, thus it was not skewing the data unnecessarily in one 
direction and was therefore not the cause of the significant negative 
correlation found (recall: r
s
=-0.341, df=36, p=0.036, recognition: 
r
s
=-0.175, df=36, p=0.293).
The ages of the participants were not greatly varied, with thirty-six 
out of thirty-nine participants aged nineteen to twenty-one, one 
participant aged twenty-three, one participant aged thirty and one 
participant not stating their age. The removal of the data for the par-
ticipant aged thirty did not change the statistical significance of the 
original result, thus the greater age of this participant in compari-
son to the others was also not the cause of the significant negative 
correlation found (recall: r
s
=-0.387, df=36, p=0.016, recognition: 
r
s
=-0.251, df=36, p=0.129). Furthermore, the imbalance in the num-
ber of male and female participants (seven male, thirty-two female) 
Figure 2. Categorisation ability versus false recall. Individuals’ 
categorisation abilities (given as the percentage of questions 
answered incorrectly on the categorisation test) plotted against 
their susceptibilities to false memories (given as the percentage of 
critical non-presented words recalled, out of those possible). Those 
individuals scoring fewer errors on the categorisation test were more 
susceptible to false memory intrusions and correspondingly had a 
higher false memory score (rs=-0.345, df=37, p=0.032).
Figure 3. Categorisation ability versus false recognition. 
Individuals’ categorisation abilities (given as the percentage of 
questions answered incorrectly on the categorisation test) plotted 
against their susceptibilities to false memories (given as the 
percentage of critical non-presented words recognised, out of 
those possible). Again, those individuals scoring fewer errors on the 
categorisation test were more susceptible to false memory intrusions 
and correspondingly had a higher false memory score, though in this 
case the correlation was not significant: rs=-0.202, df=37, p=0.219.
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and were processed for pleasantness. They concluded that whilst 
it does not at first seem adaptive for survival-related memories 
to be less accurate and in fact be more prone to false intrusions 
than other types of memory, it does make sense if considered as 
a by-product of the adaptive processing of information related to 
survival. Howe & Derbish (2010) argue that during the processing 
of information related to survival, any related information in mem-
ory is then primed, which may or may not be false, but that this 
information is then used to guide attention to other survival-related 
items, which may be crucial in the current situation (Howe & 
Derbish, 2010).
It has even been postulated that this greater inaccuracy may actually 
have adaptive significance, being more helpful in real-world sce-
narios. For example, in responses to predation threat, false alarms, 
such as generalising to a large set of cues that might indicate preda-
tor presence are clearly less detrimental errors than missing preda-
tor presence based on interpreting predators’ cues too narrowly 
(Howe & Derbish, 2010). Thus our finding of a significant positive 
correlation between susceptibility to semantic false memories in a 
free recall DRM paradigm and word-based categorisation ability, 
with the creation of these errors a by-product of our ability to group 
words, is in keeping with recent explorations of the adaptive condi-
tions related to the phenomenon of false memories.
Whilst the age range of the subjects tested was narrow (nineteen to 
twenty-one years old in the majority) many of the key studies using 
the DRM paradigm have used only participants also of average 
undergraduate college study age (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Stadler et al., 1999). Additionally the only significant difference 
in spontaneous false memory creation, caused by the DRM para-
digm that is known to occur between participants of different ages, 
is between children and adults. Several studies have shown that 
children are less prone to these memory errors, with an increase in 
their propensity occurring during both childhood and early adoles-
cence (Brainerd et al., 2002; Brainerd et al., 2004; Forrest, 2002). 
As such, inferences made from our findings are not just applicable 
to young adults but should also be pertinent to the ‘average’ adult 
population as a whole.
Our result of a significant negative correlation between individuals’ 
errors on a categorisation test and their susceptibilities to semantic 
type false memories during free recall demonstrates that false mem-
ories, to some extent, might be a by-product of our ability to learn 
rules, categories and concepts. For example, once we have learnt 
the concept/category of mammals, we can identify new animals as 
members of this category even if we have never seen them before. 
In this case, labelling the new animal as mammal is not based on 
false classification, but a correct one based on category member-
ship: the simple flipside of the DRM paradigm, where inferences 
based on concepts and categories are classed as errors. Thus, our 
findings add to the increasing body of literature that proposes that 
some types of false memories might be an inevitable by-product 
of adaptive cognitive processes as is the case with other memory 
aberrations (Abbott & Sherratt, 2011; Beck & Forstmeier, 2007; 
Newman & Lindsay, 2009).
is unlikely to have caused any bias in the data as there was no sig-
nificant difference between the two genders in the mean values 
for the recall errors (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W=114, p=0.956), 
recognition errors (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W=97.5, p=0.605) nor 
the categorisation test scores (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W=102, 
p=0.727).
Discussion
Our findings show a trade-off between word categorisation ability 
and semantic false memory susceptibility, so that individuals that 
make more errors on the false memory test make fewer errors on 
the categorisation test, and vice versa. Thus our results cannot 
simply be explained by differences in level of education, literacy, 
vocabulary or intelligence. If such an underlying factor would have 
explained performance on both tasks, then superior performance on 
one task would have been a predictor of superior performance on 
the other task. For example, short term memorisation of word lists 
recruits working memory, which is often regarded as a general pre-
dictor of intelligence (Oberauer et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2008) 
and likewise the categorisation tests used here are typical compo-
nents of standardised intelligence tests (Wechsler, 2004; Wechsler, 
2008). Thus one might have predicted a positive correlation of error 
scores in both tasks if an underlying single factor such as intel-
ligence would explain the data. However, the correlation of error 
scores in the two measured tasks was negative. Thus even though 
this study is clearly correlative in nature, and therefore does not 
allow us to conclude with certainty that the two performances are 
based on the same underlying mechanisms, it is intriguing that hav-
ing a lower tendency to generate false memories comes at a cost, i.e. 
lower categorisation scores.
To date the majority of scholars interested in false memories have 
focused on factors which may exacerbate or reduce the occurrence 
of such memory errors (Dodson et al., 2000). The adaptive nature 
of the human memory system as a potential reason for the occur-
rence false memories has been suggested (Schacter, 1999; Schacter, 
2001), yet the ultimate reasons for their existence has been infre-
quently explored empirically. More recently, however, evidence has 
grown for links between individuals’ differing susceptibilities to 
false memories and their variations in a range of cognitive features. 
False recall and/or recognition rates in a DRM paradigm have been 
shown to vary with individuals’ variations in levels of vivid men-
tal imagery (Winograd et al., 1998), specific area expertise (Baird, 
2003; Castel et al., 2007), working memory capacity (Watson et al., 
2005) and need for cognition (the degree to which an individual 
actively engages in cognitive tasks) (Graham, 2007).
Additionally it has been shown that when survival-related (i.e. evo-
lutionarily relevant) information is used in a list-learning paradigm, 
increased susceptibility to false memories occurs. Howe & Derbish, 
(2010) found that when participants are asked to process words for 
their survival value and when the words presented were themselves 
survival relevant (i.e., ‘death: burial, casket, cemetery, funeral, 
grave, life, murder, suicide, tragedy, widow), veridical and false rec-
ognition were significantly higher (leading to an overall decrease in 
net accuracy) than when the words viewed were neutral or negative 
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 Tom Smulders
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In this paper, Hunt and Chittka show that people who are better at a categorization task also tend to
produce more "memory errors" on the DRM paradigm, in which 15 words are shown which are strongly
associated with a non-presented word (which is then often (wrongly) recalled or recognized later by the
participants). The experiment has been conducted properly (the issue of counterbalancing has been
addressed by the priming re-analysis) and the results are clear, although the effect size does not seem
large.
The conclusions the authors draw from this result seem eminently reasonable, although they may go a bit
beyond the immediate data. After all, they specifically picked a form of false-memory testing that relies
heavily on the fact that words in a semantic category are tightly associated with each other. It is then not a
great surprise that people who are good at keeping words from the same semantic categories together
also show more memory errors. It might have been interesting to ask people to categorize on different
criteria than semantic (e.g. based on the letters they contain). Even though this is still a test of finding odd
words out in a group, it does not call on semantic categories...
The introduction is probably setting up a bit of a straw man. I think false memories as discussed here
should be limited to those in episodic memory. Even the DRM is an episodic memory task (recall the
unique list you've just been presented with), which is influenced by semantic associations between words.
Therefore, any discussion of selective pressures on memory accuracy should be based on episodic
memory alone. And there are lots of debates about what episodic memory is for, and indeed whether
accuracy is the most important part of episodic memories. False memories in episodic memories often
come about by "intrusion" of more common events into a unique episode. If the common events are that
common, the unique exception may not be important to remember and indeed may interfere with the
(adaptive) application of a learned rule. So there may be many arguments against the idea that memory
should always be accurate. Nevertheless, this does not take away from the data or the final conclusions
of this paper.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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, School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, Queen Mary, University of London, UKLars Chittka
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We thank the referee for the constructive comments. We agree with the referee that one function of
cognition (probably not just episodic memory) is to extract commonalities between distinct
individual memories, learn rules, and to categorise objects and events by common properties, and
to classify novel objects or events into existing frameworks. Certainly such rule-learning and
classification abilities are adaptive, and we have thus deleted the statement that “false memories
cannot in themselves be useful”.
Nonetheless, it is probably fair to say that many of the contexts in which false memories occur
‘naturally’, as well as the common experimental paradigms (not just ours), rely on rule learning and
classification abilities. Witnesses of a nocturnal street robbery might describe the perpetrator as a
hooded teenager, when it later turns out that the assailant was middle-aged and balding. While
such false memories create enormous difficulties for the police and criminal courts, the witnesses
may have made of use of their (typically, but clearly not always, adaptive) ability to learn rules
about settings or conditions that, at least potentially, indicate danger. From the earliest explorations
of false memories, such as the transmission chain studies in Bartlett’s work, it was investigated
how distorted memories fall in with previously memorised rules, cultural norms etc.  Whether this
means that individuals that are better at extracting common properties incur a cost when it comes
to storing large number of individual items/memories is precisely the subject of this study. We
agree with the referee that it might sometimes be more useful to memorise common events than
individual ones, or indeed to extract the commonalities between events and discard their
idiosyncrasies, and this is hopefully clearer in the revised version. 
 No competing interests.Competing Interests:
 08 August 2014Referee Report
doi:10.5256/f1000research.4966.r5492
 Rob Nash
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, UK
This is an interesting article that has good relevance to ongoing debates on the adaptiveness of memory
errors. The methods and analyses are appropriate and the authors have generally represented the
scientific literature well. I have a few minor suggestion for improvement, as follows:
 
In the paragraph beginning “ ” itWhile such tests might be viewed as rather remote from real-life situations..
should be noted that there are several more studies in which errors in different false memory paradigms
are correlated either weakly (e.g., ) or not at all (e.g. ).Zhu , 2013et al. Ost ., 2013et al
 
The line “ ” is disputable – several studies nowClearly false memories cannot in themselves be useful
show positive consequences of distorted memories, see e.g. ; Howe, Garner & Patel, 2013 Bernstein &
).Loftus, 2009
 
Line “It is therefore possible that memory errors are an inevitable fluke of a powerful, adaptive cognitive
 – I would prefer to say  – there is a broad literature on other adaptivephenomenon” “some memory errors”
reasons why memory errors occur, see e.g. . Same point applies to the veryNewman & Lindsay (2009)
final sentence of the Discussion.
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Why wasn't the order of the two tasks counterbalanced? Is it plausible that the first (memory) task might
have primed a particular mindset in participants that affected their categorization performance? I’d
suggest the addition of a little discussion of this point.
 
Data analysis – which data departed from normality? The authors have reported a normality test but it isn't
clear to which variable this test pertains.
 
The line “A significant negative correlation was still found for free recall and a moderate negative
” – the authors should reiterate explicitly that the latter correlation wascorrelation still found for recognition
non-significant.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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, School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, Queen Mary, University of London, UKLars Chittka
We thank the referee for the constructive comments. We have taken all of them on board in the
revised version. We have also added the five additional references indicated by the referee, and
modified the text in line with the contents of these publications. We have added the requested
information about non-normality of some of the data.
The referee asks why we have not used a counterbalanced design, so that in addition to setting the
false memory test first and the categorisation test second, we might have reversed the order. This
would indeed be a useful procedure to exclude the possibility that any correlation could be caused
by priming, occurring as a result of words occurring in both tests. However, to address the potential
complication of priming, we had already reanalysed the data excluding those categorisation test
questions that contained words previously presented in the DRM word lists, and non-presented as
one of the critical non-presented words. However, even after removal of all individual tasks where
such words occurred, the overall results remained unaltered (see results section). 
 No competing interests.Competing Interests:
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